 

Syria as candidate for air attack

## Purpose

## Scope

## Guidance

## Maps

# Air Force Objectives

## General Principles

## Air defense

## Ideal Aerospace objective

## CJTF objective in war with Syria

1. Deny Syrian offensive capability against neighboring countries.
2. Eliminate threat from Syrian WMD programs
3. Reduce threat from terror groups and insurgency groups that gain support from Syria.

## Applications of principles in this study

# Environment

## Geographical

## Population

## National Character

## Economy

Agriculture and oil

## Political-military foundation

Very centralized system, hierarchical

## Summary

# Fielded Military Forces

## National Military Policy

### Doctrine

Very centralized system, hierarchical

The Syrians recognize that effective command and control is critical for success in modern combined arms warfare. Their method of insuring success is to establish and to maintain a system of tightly centralized control over the combat and supporting forces at each level of command.

The Syrian commander at each level is charged with overall responsibility for his forces. Syrian doctrine emphasizes that under the fluid conditions of modern warfare, even during carefully planned operations, the commander must accomplish assigned missions on his own initiative without constant guidance from above. To do this, the commander must be well informed about the general situation and the intentions of the senior commander. The Corps commander is responsible for the conduct of the entire operation in which his Corps is involved and for carrying out long-term operational plans. Division commanders, in turn, receive their missions from their respective Corps commanders.

Neutralization of the centralized command and control structure will have the effect of paralyzing the organization. If a division HQ/ Division commander is neutralized the Divisions operations will come to a standstill, and it will take some time (1-2 days) before the command structure is re-established and a new commander is place to work effectively.

### Influence of geographic and economic factors

Revenue from export of oil from the oil industry in Syria is very important for the Syrian economy. Attacks or threats of attacks against the oil industry will create pressure and set conditions for leverage during negotiations in final phases of a conflict.

Due to the geography with a exposed coastline to the Eastern Mediterranean (EMED) and bordering to Israel and Turkey as a enemy, and Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan as neutral countries Syria have created a strategic depth towards the Iraqi border and placed high value items, critical infrastructure and important research in the desert far away from the coast and its enemies. In addition, along the coast and the borders of Israel and Turkey a heavy focus on air defense is in place.

### Perceived greatest threat

Syria’s perceived greatest threat is western airpower and ability to conduct power projection from the air. Because of this Syria have put down a significant effort in increasing its air defense structure, and this is together with the WMD program the prioritized effort in the Syrian Armed Forces.

### Other planning factors

## Defense Establishment

### Military research

#### Al Safira Military Research Center (OPARTGT081)

Syrian military research for all domains is primarily done at Al Safira Military Research Center (OPARTGT081) about 17nm SOUTHEAST of Aleppo. This research facility is both an academic centre for research, and a center where military officers are sent to develop new doctrine and tactics for the Syrian armed forces. The research center is the central node in the Syrian military research, and it leads and coordinates research at other Syrian installations. The recent years the priority has been on air defense and missile and rocket technology. A focus has also been on the development of armor and reverse engineering of Russian T90 Tanks to start own production line of T90 tanks. Biological warfare also a priority and focus of effort for this research center, as the center is in competition with Sarqiyha Reserach Center (OPARTGT059) which is researching on chemical weapons. Both as part of the Syrian WMD program.

### Army

OPARTGT001 Syrian Army HQ building 1

OPARTGT002 Syrian Army HQ building 2

### Navy

#### Syrian Navy HQ (OPARTGT100)

Syrian Navy HQ reports to the General staff in wartime and coordinates all Syrian maritime operations. This headquarter also coordinates with any other nations that are supporting Syrian maritime operations. This headquarter is responsible for ensuring safety of crucial supplies into Syria via the sea and is also responsible for any reinforcement from the sea from supporting nations.

If destroyed, the Syrian ability to coordinate maritime operations will be severely reduced, and it will create chaos in receiving supplies from civilian ship traffic with the potential to slow down the steady flow of supplies from the sea by 50%.

### Airforce

OPARTGT103 Syrian Air Force Headquarter

## Command, Control and Communications

IADS Control / Sector Control Centres , with backup.., explain

OPARTGT066 Syrian ADCC

OPARTGT067 SCC SOUTH

OPARTGT068 SCC EAST

OPARTGT069 SCC WEST

## Weapons of Mass Destruction

* Delivery means (SCUD)

#### Aleppo SCUD Storage site (OPARTGT020)

Syrian Armed Forces are secretly storing SCUDs at a civilian storage area in Aleppo. It is likely that these SCUD’s are placed in storage covertly in an attempt to avoid them being targeted. It is likely that these SCUDs are connected to the Syrian weapon of mass destruction program and can be used for delivery of chemical weapons.

#### Al-Dumayr SCUD storage site (OPARTGT019)

The second storage for SCUDs associated with the weapon of mass destruction program is the Al-Dumayr SCUD storage site with its hardened bunkers. It is likely that Syrian Armed Forces are storing SCUDs in these hardened bunkers in order to keep them safe from air attacks from coalition forces. It is likely that vehicles will not be taken out from the facility before they are planned to be used.

* OPARTGT003 922nd SCUD regiment base
* OPARTGT004 923rd SCUD Regiment base
* OPARTGT102 924th SCUD Regiment base
* Chemicals
* Other?

## Space

NSTR

## Air

OPARTGT072 60th Air Division Headquarter

OPARTGT073 70th Air Division Headquarter

OPARTGT074 80th Air Division Headquarter

OPARTGT036 Minhak Airbase

OPARTGT037 Aleppo International Airport

OPARTGT038 Kuweires Airbase

OPARTGT039 Jirah Airbase

OPARTGT040 Tabqa Airbase

OPARTGT041 Abu al-Duhur Airbase

OPARTGT042 Taftanaz Airbase

OPARTGT043 Bassel Al-Assad Int Airport

OPARTGT044 Hama Military Airport

OPARTGT045 Palmyra Airport

OPARTGT046 An Nasiriyah Airbase

OPARTGT047 Al-Dumary Military Airport

OPARTGT048 Maji Al Sultan Heliport

OPARTGT049 Der Salman Heliport

OPARTGT050 Damascus Int Airport

OPARTGT051 Qabr al-Sitt Heliport

OPARTGT052 Mezzeh Military Airport

OPARTGT053 Marj Ruhayyil Airbase

OPARTGT054 Khalkhalah Airbase

## Land

OPARTGT 062 (Syrian Air Defence Academy): Used for training of Syrian Air Defense Forces

OPARTGT075 1st Corps Base

OPARTGT076 2nd Corps Base

OPARTGT077 3rd Corps Base

OPARTGT078 4th Corps Base

OPARTGT079 5th Corps Base

OPARTGT071 931st Special Forces Brigade

Syrian Army Reserve: 6th Corps

* Mobilization areas /bases locations for 3 divisions (7 day
* Staging areas

91st Republican Guard Armored Division (Strategic reserve), Damascus (T-80)

## Sea

OPARTGT055 Syr Naval Base Latakia

OPARTGT005 Jablah Navy port

OPARTGT006 SYR Navy storage

## Unconventional Warfare

### Alsyf Almuqadas

Alsyf Almuqadas, السيف المقدس (Holy Sword) is an international terrorist group that supports the Syrian Regime. The terrorist group is based in Syria, but have cells operating in several countries including Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. Alsyf Almuqadas is capable of conducting complex attacks using both Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) in combination with attackers. The group is also reported to have been trying to acquire drones. It is likely that the groups is backed by IRAN and used in as a proxy for attacks against western influence in the region.

The group is led by Mehmed Salo, and he is responsible for several attacks against western forces in the region.

### Insurgency group B

### Hezbollah proxy

## Summary

## Armed Forces as candidate for Aerospace attack

## Armed Forces Counterair/counterspace capability

# Population

## Food supply

## Clothing

## Shelter

## Publich health

### Hospitals/direct health care

NO STRIKE TGTS

### Sanitation/water supply

NO STRIKE TGTS

### Public utilities

## Agriculture

## Basic Industry

## Information

## Summary

# Infrastructure

## Communications

#### International communication center (OPARTGT035)

The international communications center (OPARTGT035) is a dual use facility. It is used by civilian Syrian media as well as international media. In addition, the Syrian Armed Forces are using one part of the building to create and broadcast propaganda on behalf of the Syrian Regime. In another part of the building the Syrian Armed Forces have a backup server for their command-and-control communications network that controls the armed forces.

Due to the dual use and nature of this target with civilian international media, it is a sensitive target that needs approval from CJTF-82 Commander for engagement.

#### Syrian Intelligence Internet Agency (SIIA) (OPARTGT094)

Syria Intelligence Internet Agency (SIIA) (OPARTGT094) serves two functions for the Syrian Armed Forces. The primary purpose is to collect intelligence in cyberspace. The second purpose is to conduct offensive operations in cyberspace. It is likely that SIIA are working towards CJTF forces both for collection and for offensive operations. Assessed targets of high interest for SIIA is penetrating command and control networks for collecting intelligence and penetrating Air Defense (Patriot and ship based air defense), as well as logistics systems to hamper CJTF resupplies of critical items into the theater.

### Telecommunications

### Broadcast Media

#### Damascus radio tower (OPARTGT034)

Damascus radio tower (OPARTGT034) is a dual use facility. Its primary purpose is to serve the Syrian society with radio coverage in the Damascus area in addition to provide the Syrian government long range communications (HF) with other parts of Syria. In addition, the Syrian Armed Forces are using the facility for long range (HF) communications for the armed forces. This tower is part of the command-and-control network for Syrian Armed Forces. Primarily communications from the general staff to the various services and Corps commanders are sent from this installation. Destruction of the tower will reduce redundancy in Syrian Armed Forces ability to command and control own forces, and together with other efforts against the command-and-control network can hamper the Syrian General Staff’s ability to give new direction to its commanders. Due to the dual use and nature of this target with civilian use of the radio long range communication, it is a sensitive target that needs approval from CJTF-82 Commander for engagement.

#### Syrian Broadcasting Headquarter (OPARTGT070)

The Syrian Broadcasting Headquarter (OPARTGT070) is a dual use facility. Its primary purpose is to be the home of the Syrian broadcasting company with workspace, offices and studios for both television and radio for several Syrian channels controlled by the Syrian Broadcasting Company. The Syrian regime is controlling the company and is using some of the channels to broadcast propaganda to the civilian population and the armed forces. Due to the nature of this target as a media outlet, it is categorized as a sensitive target that needs approval from CJTF-82 Commander for engagement.

### Information Flow

## Electrical Power

OPARTGT082 Powerplant-Coal

OPARTGT083 Power distribution

OPARTGT084 Powerplant – Coal

OPARTGT090 Powerplant

OPARTGT092 Powerdistribution

OPARTGT099 Powerdistribution

## Roads

## Railroads

* Key targets that connect factories and bases?

## Shipping

## Civil aviation

## Summary

# System Essentials

## Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL)

* Important oil reserves, can supply a Division for XX days.
* Fuel reserves, can supply squadrons/wings/sectors with fuel for XX days?
* Oil refineries, needed to produce jet fuel. Destruction may limit available sorties

**Jet fuel:**

Each Air Force airbase contains fuel for 84 sorties. (7 days with 12 sorties per day). This is normally placed in primary fuel depot (5 days) and secondary fuel depot (2 days).

Fuel depots supplies the Air Force base every day. The fuel depot have fuel for 420 sorties (7 days, 5 airbases 12 sorties per day).

Every day a fuel convoy from the fuel depot transits from the depot to the airbase to ensure the base is full up on fuel.

If primary or secondary fuel depots are destroyed, then the airbase can not store fuel, and will need resupply convoys each day until a fuel depot can be constructed. Temporary fuel depot can be constructed in XX days, and contains fuel for 3 days.

Each fueltruck have fuel for 3 sorties, so a total of 4 vehicles needed for a full day of sorties.

So a total of 3 things that can be attacked:

* Airbase (primary and secondary)
* Fuel depot (prevent long term usage)
* Convoy ( prevent supplies for a time period.

## Strategic Materials

OPARTGT085 Oil Storage

OPARTGT087 Oil Storage

#### OPARTGT089 Oil Storage

Primary storage for fuel in the northern sector. (Abu ul Duhur, tabqa, Jirah).

The fuel storage contains jet fuel for 420 days.

If destroyed: Will reduce the

## Military production

#### Tartus Vehicle factory (OPARTGT 021)

The vehicle factory in Tartus is producing military vehicles. It have been reported to be able to produce several types of vehicles at the same time as the factory is large. The factory is also producing SA-15 SAMs on an export licence from Russia and is thus a important contribution to Syrian Air Defence. If needed, the factory can shift focus and change all production lines into the prioritized vehicles to double or triple the output of a certain type of vehicle. The factory currently are able to sustain XX production lines.

#### Raqqa vehicle factory (OPARTGT 022)

The vehicle factory in Tartus is producing military vehicles. It have been reported to be able to produce several types of vehicles at the same time as the factory is large. The factory is also producing SA-2 SAMs on an export licence from Russia and is thus a important contribution to Syrian Air Defence. If needed, the factory can shift focus and change all production lines into the prioritized vehicles to double or triple the output of a certain type of vehicle. The factory currently are able to sustain XX production lines.

#### Aleppo vehicle factory (OPARTGT023)

The vehicle factory in Aleppo is producing both civilian and military trucks. The factory is specialized in producing trucks using for supply operations both for the military and the civilian sector. This factory is producing trucks for Syrian logistical units such as supply trucks for ammunition, food and fuel.

OPARTGT030 Aircraft parts factory

OPARTGT031 Aircraft parts factory

OPARTGT032 Aircraft parts factory

OPARTGT033 Aircraft factory

OPARTGT023 Vehicle factory

OPARTGT024 Vehicle factory

OPARTGT025 Vehicle factory

OPARTGT026 Vehicle factory

Produces EWR’s

OPARTGT027 Vehicle factory

OPARTGT028 Vehicle factory

Produce MBT

OPARTGT029 Vehicle factory

SCUD production

OPARTGT007 Ammunition Factory

OPARTGT008 Ammunition Factory

OPARTGT009 Ammunition Factory

OPARTGT010 Ammunition Factory

OPARTGT011 Ammunition Factory

OPARTGT012 Ammunition Factory

OPARTGT013 Ammunition Factory

OPARTGT014 Ammunition Factory

OPARTGT015 Ammunition Factory

OPARTGT016 Ammunition Factory

OPARTGT017 Ammunition Factory

OPARTGT018 Ammunition Factory

## WMD

### Chemical - Production facilities, research facilities

OPARTGT057 Chemical Weapon storage

OPARTGT058 Chemical Weapon research facility

OPARTGT059 Chemical Weapon research facility - Sarqiyha Reserach Center

OPARTGT060 Chemical Weapon production facility

OPARTGT061 XXX Chemical Weapon Storage

### Nuclear – facility being built, research facility

### Biological – Research facility

See [Al Safira Military Research Center](#_Al_Safira_Military)

## Summary

# Leadership

## Key people/institutions

* General XX Head of Air Force
* General XX Head of Air Defense Forces (IADS)
* General XX Head of Army
* General XX Head of Navy
* General XX Head of Intelligence service

OPARTGT095 Syrian Ministry of Defense

OPARTGT096 Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

OPARTGT097 Syrian Ministry of Finance

### The Syrian National Military Command Authority

The Syrian National Military Command Authority exercises complete control over the military-economic planning and activities of Syria. It is composed of three major bodies:

• The Council of Defense.

• The Main Military Council.

• The General Staff.

#### The Council of Defense / State Committee of Defense (War cabinet)

The Council of Defense is responsible for planning and preparing the country for war. It is chaired by the General Secretary of the National Party of Syria. The council is made up of selected National party members, including the Minister of Defense. This council is Syria’s highest military-economic planning agency; it deliberates interrelated issues concerning the nation's defenses, economic plans, and government branches. These include the mobilization of industry, transportation, and manpower for war, and the peacetime structure of the armed forces. Its deliberation and decrees are translated into law. In wartime, this body would be reorganized into the State Committee of Defense -essentially a war cabinet with oversight of the political, diplomatic, and economic aspects of the nation at war, as well as general policy matters concerned with the conduct of military operations.

#### The Main Military Council / Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

The Main Military Council is immediately responsible to the Council of Defense for the overall leadership and status of the Syrian armed forces in peacetime. The Minister of Defense heads this council. The Chairman of the Council of Defense is a member, as are the First Deputy Ministers of Defense. The ministers include the Chief of the General Staff .Other members include the commanders of the five military services (Army, Navy, Airforce, Air Defence Forces, Special Forces), the Chief of the Main Political Administration, the Chief of the Rear Services, and the Chief of Civil Defense

In wartime, the council is transferred into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which represent the top echelon of Syrian wartime military-control. The General Secretary of the National Party, as Chairman of the State Committee of Defense, becomes the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Syrian Armed Forces. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command plans and direct strategic operations on a large scale through different theaters of military operations, sizing and allocating forces to implement its plans. The number of fronts, their composition, missions, and the general plans for the conduct of strategic operations will be established by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It also will monitor individual front and fleet actions and supervise coordination between them.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command is located in building of the Syrian Ministry of Defence (OPARTGT095)

#### The General Staff

The General Staff is the major link in the centralization of the Syrian National Military Command Authority. The General Staff is the executive agency for the Main Military Council in peacetime and The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in wartime. The Syrian General Staff is charged with the basic military planning for the Syrian Armed Forces, both in peace and war. The military services, the military districts, and the Groups of Forces outside Syria report to the Minister of Defense through the General Staff in peacetime. In wartime, field forces) reports to the Supreme Commander in Chief and the headquarters of the supreme high command through the General Staff.

## Control Systems

## Opposition

## Communications

## Strategic capabilities/assets

SCUD

OPARTGT003 922nd SCUD regiment base

OPARTGT004 923rd SCUD Regiment base

OPARTGT102 924th SCUD Regiment base

WMD

Special Forces

OPARTGT071 931st Special Forces Brigade

## External politics /alliances

Russia: Close connection

Iran: Close connection

China: Opposed to CJTF and the allies. Supporting Syria

Egypt: Supporting Russia

Pakistan: Syria deliver technology to Pakistan and receive jets and military support.

Jordan /Lebanon (neutral)

France

## Summary